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MALICIOUS CONTENT ON THE INTERNET:
NARROWING IMMUNITY UNDER THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
JOANNA SCHORR†
INTRODUCTION
One afternoon at a prestigious United States university, a
new thread titled “[b]iggest slut on campus” appeared on the
anonymous online gossip website JuicyCampus.com.1 Those who
could not resist the urge to peruse the thread were inundated
with the names of female students who attended that prestigious
university. Some posts included both the first and last names of
the students.2
Some posts included the women’s phone
numbers.3 All the posts libelously declared that these women
were “sluts” with all the impurity and shame that the term
entails. The law has long given special treatment to statements
imputing impurity for a woman4 because of the potentially
harmful repercussions of those statements.
When future
employers searched the names of these female students on the
Internet, posts from JuicyCampus surfaced with claims that

†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s University
School of Law; B.A., 2010, Brandeis University. Special thanks to Vice Dean
Emeritus Andrew J. Simons for his guidance and support in writing this Note.
1
See, e.g., Lawsuits, Weak Economy Kill JuicyCampus.com, FOX NEWS (Feb. 5,
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,488424,00.html [hereinafter Lawsuits].
The situation presented in this introduction is a hypothetical situation based on
facts taken from a variety of true stories about JuicyCampus.
2
See, e.g., What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 8,
2007, 6:38 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/12/08/what-you-don-tknow-can-hurt-you.html.
3
See, e.g., William Creeley, Regarding JuicyCampus.com, THE FIRE (Mar. 21,
2008), http://thefire.org/article/9065.html.
4
Imputing impurity for a woman is one of four categories of defamation per se
which do not require proof of special damages. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL.,
PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 891–92 (12th ed.
2010).
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everyone on campus has had sex with these women. These
bright, engaging women were victims of JuicyCampus’ proactive
campaign inducing college students to “[g]ive us the juice.”5
The sinister and malicious website grew rapidly.
On
Monday, October 6, 2008, JuicyCampus announced that the
completely anonymous gossip website was accessible on 500
campuses.6 JuicyCampus provided an anonymous forum for
users to post salacious comments about their peers with no
restrictions, supervision, or censure.7 In addition to “[b]iggest
slut on campus,” topic threads on these 500 campuses included
“easiest freshmen,”8 “ugliest sorority girl,”9 and “[g]ayest [f]rat
[b]oys,”10 among others. Not only could anyone create threads
and post comments, anyone with access to the Internet could
read the website.
Despite the impact of the vicious words circulating through
JuicyCampus, the targeted students had no recourse. The reason
that the targeted students had no recourse is that the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”)11 immunizes
websites like JuicyCampus that do not actually post the
comments, but rather allow third parties to post comments. The
CDA’s broad immunity for website owners poses a problem for
victims since action can only be taken against the individual
user.12 Taking action against the initial poster is small solace for

5

Dhwani Shah, JuicyCampus Gushes Gossip, THE DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Feb.
22, 2008), http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2008/02/22/20117/. The website’s slogan
was “Always Anonymous . . . Always Juicy.” Does JuicyCampus Go Too Far?, CBS
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2010, 11:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500163_1623968514.html.
6
500 Campuses!!!, OFFICIAL JUICYCAMPUS BLOG (Oct. 6, 2008, 11:12 AM),
http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-10-24T14:34:00-07:00
&max-results=7.
7
See generally Richard Bernstein, The Growing Cowardice of Online
Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/
americas/27iht-letter.1.15670185.html.
8
Lawsuits, supra note 1.
9
See Bella English, Dorm Rumors, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2008, at G10.
10
See Jeffrey R. Young, JuicyCampus Shuts Down, Blaming the Economy, Not
the Controversy, THE CHRONICLE (Feb. 5, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/
JuicyCampus-Shuts-Down/1506/.
11
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
12
Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act,
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.citmedialaw.org/legalguide/immunity-online-publishers-under-communications-decency-act (“Section 230
does not immunize the actual creator of content. The author of a defamatory
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three reasons. First, the damage suffered is disproportionate to
the amount the individual can pay.13 Second, it is difficult to
identify the poster because in the case of JuicyCampus, and
many similar websites, users post anonymously,14 and it is nearly
impossible to trace those anonymous users.15 Finally, litigation
costs outweigh the benefit of a lawsuit because lawsuits against
such individuals often provide limited, if any, financial benefit.16
The problem is that JuicyCampus is but one of many
websites17 that solicit malicious content. These websites target
college campuses, small towns, and even business competitors.18
In each of these cases the websites actively solicit defamatory
content, but because of the CDA they are immune from the
consequences of their actions.
This Note argues that the scope of CDA § 230, which
provides immunity to Internet Service Providers in defamation
suits for content posted by third-party users,19 should be
narrowed in circumstances where a website actively solicits
statement, whether he is a blogger, commenter, or anything else, remains just as
responsible for his online statements as he would be for his offline statements.”).
13
See Richard Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2008, at ST7.
14
Id.
15
See JuicyCampus.com Gives Forum to Anonymous Posters, THE UNIVERSITY
DAILY KANSAN (Oct. 8, 2008), http://kansan.com/archives/2008/10/08/juicycampuscom-gives-forum-to-anonymous-posters/.
16
See Ian C. Ballon, The Good Samaritan Exemption and the CDA, in ECOMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW: A LEGAL TREATISE WITH FORMS 528 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Ser. No. 19009, 2d ed.
2009); see also Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the
Blogosphere: New Solutions for an Old Problem, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 607, 631 (2006)
(“While none of these major corporations are eager to expend money on litigation,
they certainly have the resources to do so if necessary. For the average blogger, this
is simply not the case. Given that the average associate salary at many large firms is
around $300 per hour, a motion to dismiss and reply brief that took forty hours to
write, edit, and file would place the cost of litigation at $12,000. This assumes the
associate did all of the work, no oral argument is granted, and no discovery is served
with the motion. If a partner edits the brief, her $500 per hour rate would break the
bank for most individuals.”).
17
JuicyCampus has since shutdown, purportedly a result of recent “economic
downturn.” See Lawsuits, supra note 1. However, JuicyCampus was but one of many
of these soliciting websites, for example, campusgossip.com, collegeacb.com,
gossipreport.com, rottenneighbor.com, and thedirty.com.
18
See, e.g., Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y. Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 284–85, 952
N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (2011); Morgan, supra note 13; A.G.
Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves to the Web, and Turns Vicious, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A1.
19
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
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malicious content from its users. Part I discusses gossip websites
and blogs that are currently immunized by § 230 and analyzes
social issues that result from the broad interpretation of the
CDA. Part II briefly discusses the law of defamation, followed by
a discussion of the policies behind the CDA’s enactment, and the
statute’s current scope in regard to defamation suits. Part III
analyzes the flaws of the different approaches currently
employed by the courts to determine whether a website qualifies
for § 230 immunity. Part IV argues that removing websites that
solicit malicious content from the scope of the CDA will better
uphold the core policies behind its enactment.
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INTERNET

There is a steady trend on the Internet for websites to host
anonymous threads that solicit content that has a tendency to be
The communities most affected by this
defamatory.20
questionable behavior are college and high school campuses,
small towns, and business competitors.21 Despite the varied
settings of these communities, one solution would suffice to
remedy the problem in all of these communities.
A.

JuicyCampus and Related Websites

Perhaps the most notorious website to solicit defamatory
content from its users is JuicyCampus.com. JuicyCampus was a
website that plagued college campuses, asking its users to
“C’mon. Give us the juice”22 by anonymously posting gossip
about their peers. The New York Times described JuicyCampus
as a website that “allows students to participate in a collegiate
version of celebrity gossip sites like TMZ.com and
PerezHilton.com; it is a dorm bathroom wall writ large, one that
anyone with Internet access can read from and post to.”23 The
most prevalent topics were promiscuity, intelligence,
attractiveness, and superlatives about different fraternities and

20
21
22
23

See supra Introduction.
See infra Part I.A–C.
Shah, supra note 5.
Morgan, supra note 13.
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sororities on campus.24 Other threads “identified women who
had gained weight and one post named a rape victim and said
she ‘deserved it.’ ”25
Although JuicyCampus founder and Chief Executive Officer
Matt Ivester shut down the website in February 2009, other
similar anonymous gossip websites happily filled the void. In
fact, JuicyCampus redirected all traffic to College Anonymous
Confessions Board (“Collegeacb”).26 Collegeacb was a similar
website to JuicyCampus, soliciting anonymous collegiate gossip.27
Some topic threads on Collegeacb included “Best Ass—whose got
it?” and “Which Freshman girls are blackballed from houses.”28
Following the sale of Collegeacb, the redirection link on
JuicyCampus’ remaining blog redirects to blipdar.net, another
website that purports to be “the world’s leading website for
venting, sharing and being yourself” anonymously.29 Other
gossip websites have infiltrated high school campuses like
littlegossip.com and isharegossip.com.30 Littlegossip.com eclipses
JuicyCampus by permeating international borders, urging its
users to “[f]ind the gossip in YOUR university/college/office about
someone you know, rate it, or make your own!”31
Despite suffering emotional trauma, pain, embarrassment,
and potential career sabotage, victims have no form of recourse
because of the courts’ broad interpretation of § 230, among other
factors. First, as the courts currently interpret CDA § 230, these
Second,
gossip websites are immune from liability.32
24

See id.
Lawsuits, supra note 1.
26
Shutdown FAQs, OFFICIAL JUICYCAMPUS BLOG (Feb. 4, 2009, 11:41 AM),
http://juicycampus.blogspot.com; see also Nora Sorena Casey, Juicy Campus Folds
Citing Lack of Funds, Makes Way for New Student Gossip Site, THE CHICAGO
MAROON (Feb. 10, 2009), http://chicagomaroon.com/2009/02/10/juicy-campus-foldsciting-lack-of-funds-makes-way-for-new-student-gossip-site/.
27
See generally JuicyCampus Closing, COLLEGE ACB (Feb. 5, 2009),
http://collegeacb.blogspot.com/2009/02/juicy-campus-closing_05.html.
28
Carolyn Witte, Why We Should All Hate College ACB, THE CORNELL DAILY
SUN, Apr. 6, 2010, http://cornellsun.com/node/41938.
29
Maggie McGlinchy, Greek Life in the Post-CollegeACB Era, ONWARD STATE,
http://onwardstate.com/2011/10/06/greek-life-in-the-post-collegeacb-era/ (last visited
Mar. 21, 2013).
30
See LITTLEGOSSIP, http://www.littlegossip.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013);
see also iShare Gossip Anonymous Gossip Website Targeted, SILENT SENDER (Apr.
12, 2011), http://silentsender.blogspot.com/2011/04/isharegossip-anonymous-gossipwebsite.html.
31
LITTLEGOSSIP, http://www.littlegossip.com/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
32
See infra Part II.D.1.
25
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JuicyCampus, in particular, was “designed to shield its users
from the threat of libel claims . . . . [I]t logs the numeric Internet
protocol addresses of its users, but does not associate those
addresses with specific posts. That is unlike mainstream social
networking sites, which do maintain such detailed logs.”33 Even
if the individual poster could be identified, more often than not
there is minimal financial benefit to suing the individual.34
However, some form of recourse against websites may help
vindicate the victim and supply justice.
Moreover, granting gossip websites immunity encourages
cyberbullying.
Cyberbullying has become one of the most
prevalent issues facing today’s adolescents.35
One of the
contributing factors to cyberbullying is that it can be achieved
anonymously.36 Anonymity lowers inhibitions37 and increases the
feeling of freedom of expression, regardless of how hurtful,
immoral, or illegal that statement may be.38 While there are
many ramifications of cyberbullying, the most devastating
consequences are that adolescents have committed suicide39 and
taken violent steps against others in response to the content
posted on the Internet.40
33
Justin Pope, Students Fight Back Against Popular Juicy Campus Site,
OCALA.COM (Feb. 18, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://www.ocala.com/article/20080218/
NEWS/802180328?p=4&tc=pg; see also Witte, supra note 28.
34
See Ballon, supra note 16.
35
Kaveri Subrahmanyam & Patricia Greenfield, Online Communication and
Adolescent Relationships, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 119, 127 (2008) (“The news media are
increasingly reporting that adolescents are using electronic technologies . . . to bully
and victimize their peers. . . . 9 percent of young Internet users reported being
harassed online in the previous year.”).
36
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: An Exploratory Analysis
of Factors Related to Offending and Victimization, 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 129, 135
(2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01639620701457816.
37
Dorothy E. Leidner & Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, The Use of Information
Technology To Enhance Management School Education: A Theoretical View, 19 MIS
Q. 265, 279 (1995).
38
See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 36, at 134.
39
Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl, committed suicide after her classmate’s
parent posed as a thirteen-year-old boy who courted her for a week and then sent
her a message that “[t]he world would be a better place without [her].” Jennifer
Steinhauer, Woman Found Guilty in Web Fraud Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2008, at A25. Tyler Clementi, an eighteen-year-old student at Rutgers
University, committed suicide after his roommate streamed Tyler being intimate
with another man over the Internet. Nate Schweber, Parents of Student Who
Committed Suicide Tell Rutgers University They May Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2010, at A30.
40
See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 36, at 136.
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Small Town Gossip Mills

High school and college campuses are not the only
communities harmed by the content of such gossip websites.
Topix.com (“Topix”) “opened[ed] up [its] site, adding forums, to
give anyone the power to discuss, edit and share the news that
matters to them.”41 Instead of focusing on college campuses,
Topix developed a website that allowed anonymous posting on
“[y]our town. Your news. Your take.”42 Topix is less frequented
in big cities than it is in small, rural towns.43 The nature of
smaller towns increases the potential for embarrassment and
injured reputations as a result of contemptuous and harmful
comments.44
One local town, Mountain Grove, Missouri, has been
victimized by the recklessly harmful nature of the website
postings.45 The owner of the local diner “called Topix a ‘cesspool
of character assassination.’ ”46 One mother of two was called “a
methed-out, doped-out whore with AIDS,” none of it being true.47
The effects of these comments caused this mother to contemplate
suicide.48 Instead, she decided to move her family out of town.49
Similarly to victims of gossip websites targeting students,
victims of Topix forums also have no form of recourse. After
thirty state attorney generals challenged the website, Topix
ceased charging for removal of defamatory comments.50 Despite
increasing ease in removing comments, the website is still
immune from defamation suits under the CDA § 230 like the
other malicious gossip sites.
C.

Business Competitors

The business world also falls victim to anonymous
defamatory content.
Some businesses host blogs seeking
negative information about their competitors. Recently in New
41

About Topix, TOPIX, http://www.topix.com/topix/about (last visited Jan. 18,

2014).
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
See Sulzberger, supra note 18.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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York, the Court of Appeals decided a case in which a real estate
company’s blog solicited malicious comments about a business
competitor.51 Christakis Shiamili ran a New York City rental
and sales real estate company, Ardor Realty Corp.52 Shiamili’s
competitor, Real Estate Group of New York, Inc. (“Real Estate”),
operated an online blog focusing on New York City real estate.53
A third-party user posted a comment making allegedly
defamatory comments “under the pseudonym ‘Ardor Realty
Sucks.’ ”54 The comments included accusations that “Shiamili
mistreated his employees and was racist and anti-Semitic.”55
Real Estate’s website administrator upgraded the comment by
“Ardor Real Estate Sucks” to an independent post, adding the
heading, “ ‘Ardor Realty and Those People’ ”; the subheading,
“ ‘and now it’s time for your weekly dose of hate, brought to you
unedited, once again, by ‘Ardor Realty Sucks’. and for the record,
we are so. not. afraid’ ”; and an image depicting Jesus Christ
with Shiamili’s face and the words “Chris Shiamili: King of the
Token Jews.”56 Beneath the post was an open thread in which
anonymous users posted further allegedly defamatory content
about Shiamili, including that his business was facing financial
trouble and that he abused and cheated on his wife.57 Shiamili
asked Real Estate’s website administrator to remove the
comments.58 His request was denied.59 Like victims of the
aforementioned websites, Shiamili had no form of recourse.
Although he sued, the Court of Appeals upheld Real Estate’s
immunity under § 230.60

51
These facts originate from Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17
N.Y.3d 281, 284–85, 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014–15, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22–23 (2011). For a
full discussion of the holding and dissent of this case see infra Part III.A.
52
Shiamili, 17 N.Y.3d at 284, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
53
Id. at 284–85, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
54
Id. at 285, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See infra Part III.A.1.

FINAL_SCHORR

2013]

2/27/2014 6:30 PM

MALICIOUS CONTENT ON THE INTERNET

741

II. INTERSECTION OF THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE CDA
CDA § 230 was established in 1996,61 and its history has ever
since been intertwined with defamation litigation.62 This section
gives an overview of the law of defamation as it applies in CDA
litigation, followed by a discussion of the evolution of CDA § 230
from its enactment through its current scope.
A.

A Brief Overview of Defamation Law

In order to comprehend the impact of § 230 immunity, one
should have a basic understanding of defamation law.
Originating at common law, defamation was an implacable
offense.63 Statements that tended to harm one’s reputation were
presumed false and strict liability applied.64 In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that public officials and
public figures are required to prove “actual malice” in order to
prove that a particular statement is defamatory.65 Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. further extended the New York Times actual
malice test to private parties caught up in newsworthy events.66
Despite these decisions, states still retain the authority to
determine what constitutes defamation.67 In most states, there
are certain types of statements that are recognized as defamatory
per se, meaning that “the publication is of such a character as to
make the publisher liable for defamation although no special
harm results from it.”68 There are four types of statements that
are generally recognized as defamation per se: (1) imputing
“criminal conduct or offense”; (2) imputing “a loathsome disease”;
61

See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 901.
63
Pete Kennedy, Internet Libel – The Anonymous Writer and the Online
Publisher, 52 ADVOCATE 59, 59 (2010), available at http://gdhm.com/images/pdf/pdkinternet-libel-the-anonymous-writer-and-the-online-publisher.pdf.
64
Id.
65
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (establishing “a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with ‘actual malice’ ”).
66
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971), abrogated by Gertz v.
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–46 (1974).
67
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–46 (1974) (“For these reasons we conclude that the
States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for
defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.”).
68
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (1977). A minority of courts
hold that a statement only qualifies as defamation per se if “its defamatory meaning
is apparent on its face and without reference to extrinsic facts.” Id.
62
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(3) imputing “misconduct, lack of integrity or inability in a
person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation”; and (4) imputing
unchastity to a woman.69 When § 230 immunity is triggered,
however, even victims of comments that are defamatory per se
have no form of recourse.
B.

The Policy Reasons for Enactment

CDA § 230 was enacted in response to Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,70 a New York Supreme Court case
that found liability based on the defendant’s status as a
“publisher.”71 In that case, Prodigy operated a “computer bulletin
board” upon which third-party users could post “stock[],
One
investment[] and other financial [information].”72
unidentified user posted comments about Stratton, a securities
investment banking firm.73 One of the several comments stated
that “STRATTON’s president, committed criminal and
fraudulent acts in connection with the initial public offering of
stock of Solomon-Page Ltd.”74 The court held that Prodigy was
liable for the defamatory statements because it was acting as a
publisher.75 The court labeled Prodigy a publisher because
Prodigy “actively utiliz[ed] technology and manpower to delete
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of
offensiveness and ‘bad taste’ . . . PRODIGY [was] clearly making
decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute editorial
control.”76 Thus, Prodigy “uniquely arrogated to itself the role of
determining what is proper for its members to post and read on
its bulletin boards.”77 This decision effectively discouraged

69
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 137 (2012); see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 77 (McKinney 2011).
70
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
71
Id. at *4–5.
72
Id. at *1.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at *3 (“A finding that PRODIGY is a publisher is the first hurdle for
Plaintiffs to overcome in pursuit of their defamation claims, because one who
repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to liability as if he had originally
published it.” (citing Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977))).
76
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
77
Id.
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website operators from self-policing and removing unsatisfactory
content because they feared that they may be held liable as a
publisher in tort actions, specifically defamation suits.78
In response to Stratton, Congress recognized the policy
concerns that accompany holding website operators liable as
publishers for third-party content by passing § 230.79 Prior to the
enactment of § 230, a website that maintained any control over
the content of the website was considered a publisher.80 The
definition for publisher applied in print media was simply
applied to the Internet.81 The holding in Stratton highlighted the
problem with applying such a broad definition of publisher to the
Internet: Websites that monitored third-party content, but did
not contribute content of its own, were considered liable for
defamation for statements posted to their website.82 Holding
websites liable for third-party content would seemingly deter
people from hosting websites on the Internet, which at that time
was still in its infancy.
Congress explained in § 230(b) that it wanted “to promote
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media” by shielding
internet publishers from tort liability.83 At the time, the Internet
was still a relatively new medium. It possessed the ability to
quickly and efficiently disperse copious amounts of information
over unlimited geographical areas and at the behest of the user,
unlike any other medium.84 Most importantly, the Internet
opened the door for discussion between those providing the
information and those receiving the information, an ability that
television, the radio, and print media lacked to the same extent.85
As the public’s ability to engage in interactive speech increased,
controversial, derogatory, and defamatory comments were bound
78

See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2012); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (citing Stratton Oakmont,
Inc., 1995 WL 323710) (“In this respect, § 230 responded to a New York state court
decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.”).
80
See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710.
81
See id. at *5.
82
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
83
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2012).
84
See generally Tim Berners-Lee, Long Live the Web: A Call for Continued Open
Standards and Neutrality, 303 SCI. AM. 80 (2010), available at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=long-live-the-web (discussing the
history and development of the World Wide Web).
85
See id.
79
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to grow as well. Congress recognized that in order for people to
be willing to operate and establish websites that allow for thirdparty postings, website operators should not be deterred from
monitoring and regulating “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable”
content posted by third parties on Internet forums.86
C.

Section 230’s Definitional Distinctions

Section 230 distinguishes between two different kinds of
websites, creating two categories: “Internet computer services”
and “information content providers.” Congress defines Internet
computer services, more commonly referred to as Internet service
providers (“ISPs”), as “any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server.”87 These definitions were
established in order to differentiate between publishers on the
Internet and publishers in all other media. Under conventional
defamation laws, publishers are liable for defamatory
comments.88 However, Congress ensured that ISPs would not be
treated the same as publishers in other media under the CDA.
Congress created a separate genre for websites, thereby
removing ISPs from the sweeping definition of publishers
because they did not post any content themselves. As a result,
ISPs are immunized in defamation suits.
Comparatively,
information content providers (“ICPs”) are essentially publishers
as defined in Stratton.
ICPs are those parties that are
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.”89 ICPs, unlike ISPs, are not
immune from defamation suits because they are considered
publishers under the CDA.90 ICPs constitute publishers because
they contribute substantially to the content of the website.91
By distinguishing between ISPs and ICPs, Congress
addressed the policy concern raised by Stratton that website
operators and publishers would refrain from self-policing the
86
87
88
89
90
91

47 U.S.C. § 230(b)–(c).
Id. at (f)(2).
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 900.
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
See id.
See id.
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content posted on their sites if such responsible actions would
result in potential liability. Section 230(c) offers “[p]rotection for
‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,”92 a
direct response to Stratton.93 Section 230(c) states, “[n]o provider
or user of an [ISP] shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content
provider.”94 The Act further asserts that interactive computer
service providers cannot be held liable for “any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material
that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.”95 This statement was meant to encourage website
operators to monitor their websites for objectionable content
without fear of retribution for being responsible.96
D. The Appellate Courts’ Approaches to § 230
1.

Zeran and Its Progeny

The Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. American Online97 was the
first to address the scope of the immunity provided by CDA
§ 230. In Zeran, the court held that America Online, Inc. (“AOL”)
was an ISP and therefore immune from liability for content
posted by a third party.98 The suit arose when an unidentified
third party posted fictitious advertisements for t-shirts with
inappropriate slogans related to the 1995 bombing of a federal
building in Oklahoma City.99 The post included Zeran’s home
phone number, which was also the number he used to run his
business. As a result, Zeran was inundated with phone calls.100

92

See id. § 230(c).
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[One] purpose of
§ 230 was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of
offensive material over their services. In this respect, § 230 responded to a New York
state court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).”).
94
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
95
Id. at (c)(2)(A).
96
Id. at (b).
97
129 F.3d 327.
98
See id. at 328.
99
Id. at 329.
100
Id.
93
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Zeran contacted AOL and asked that the post be removed.101
Although AOL indicated it would remove the post, the post was
not removed, and the phone calls persisted.102 Zeran filed a
negligence suit against AOL for failure to remove and retract the
defamatory statements.103 The district court granted AOL’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings.104 Ultimately, the court
held that AOL was merely acting as an ISP because it was not
the primary content provider, thereby triggering § 230
immunity.105
The Zeran decision drew a distinction between distributors
of online content and distributors of print content for purposes of
immunity under CDA § 230.106 By classifying AOL as an ISP, the
Fourth Circuit established a judicial precedent that extended the
protections of the CDA § 230 to any online content distributor.107
Zeran, therefore, found that § 230 provides immunity to online
distributors in defamation suits where, had the same content
been distributed in hard print, the publisher’s liability would
have been determined under the applicable state defamation
laws.108 Zeran prevails as the majority view.109
Two notable cases expanded the definition of what
constitutes a publisher under the CDA § 230 by adopting the
Zeran analysis. In Batzel v. Smith,110 the Ninth Circuit held that

101

Id.
See id.
103
Id. at 328. Zeran never filed suit against the original poster, claiming that
“AOL made it impossible to identify the original party.” Id. at 329 n.1.
104
Id. at 329–30.
105
Id. at 332–33 (“The computer service provider must decide whether to
publish, edit, or withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran seeks to impose
liability on AOL for assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes
liability-the publisher role.”).
106
See id. at 330–31.
107
David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 147, 149 (1997) (“Under Zeran, the publisher of a print newspaper could face
liability for printing a defamatory letter to the editor, while the publisher of an
electronic newspaper would be immune from liability for carrying unedited the same
text, even if the publisher of the electronic newspaper acted with the requisite
degree of culpability under state tort law.”).
108
Id.
109
See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288, 952 N.E.2d
1011, 1016, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 24 (2011).
110
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
102
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a service provider or user is immune from liability under
§ 230(c)(1) when a third person . . . that created or developed the
information . . . furnished it to the provider or user under
circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position of
the service provider or user would conclude that the information
was provided for publication on the Internet.111

In the case, a third party sent an e-mail to the website, Museum
Security Network, alleging that Ellen Batzel possibly possessed
artwork stolen from Jews during World War II.112 The website
published the third-party e-mail to a Network listserv.113 Batzel’s
holding expanded the scope of immunity to websites that post
what was originally privately received third-party content under
reasonable circumstances indicating that the private content was
meant to be publicly dispersed.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the Zeran holding in Ben
Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. America Online Inc.114 In Ben
Ezra, the court held that the service provider’s simple editing of
content qualified it as a publisher.115 AOL provided stock
quotation information that it received from third parties.116 Ben
Ezra, Weinstein, and Company (“Ben Ezra”) sued AOL for
defamation and negligence, alleging that AOL “published
incorrect information concerning [Ben Ezra’s] stock price and
share volume.”117 Ben Ezra argued that AOL was not immune
under the CDA § 230 because, in addition to its role as an ISP, it
acted as an ICP by working with the stock quotation developers
in the creation and development of the information, a role mainly
comprised of communicating with the providers and deleting
incorrect symbols.118 The court held that deleting symbols from
stock information was the role of a publisher and therefore,
under Zeran, AOL constituted an ISP—as opposed to an ICP—
triggering § 230 immunity.119

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1022.
206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983.
Id.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 985–86.
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The Zeran line of cases provides a three-prong test for
determining whether a defendant is immunized under § 230.120
First, the defendant must be an ISP or ISP user. Second, the
defendant must have been acting as a publisher. Third, the
information at issue must have been provided by a third party.121
This test pulls its requirements directly from the language of
§ 230,122 interpreting the text literally. If all three of these
requirements are met, § 230 immunizes the defendant even if it
would be liable under state defamation laws.123
2.

The Minority View

Some courts have applied standards different from Zeran’s
standard to cases involving § 230.124 In Doe v. GTE Corp.,125 for
example, the plaintiff sued companies providing web hosting
services to websites that were selling videos of undressing
athletes recorded by hidden cameras in locker rooms.126 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision to dismiss the claim.127
However, the court also explicitly rejected the Zeran approach to
§ 230 in its analysis.128
Instead, the court provided two
alternative interpretations of § 230. The first interpretation
120
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
121
Id. (“Three elements are thus required for § 230 immunity: (1) the defendant
must be a provider or user of an ‘interactive computer service’; (2) the asserted
claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the
challenged communication must be ‘information provided by another information
content provider.’ ”).
122
See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
123
Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
863, 872–73 (2010) (“When confronted with facts that force a resolution of the
ambiguous distinction between service provider and content provider, courts almost
unfailingly resolve the issue in favor of immunity. Unless a service provider literally
and unambiguously pens the words of the content in question, it will be immune
from liability.”).
124
Samuel J. Morley, How Broad Is Web Publisher Immunity Under §230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996?, 84 FLA. B.J. 8, 12 (2010).
125
347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
126
Id. at 656–57.
127
Id. at 662.
128
Id. at 660 (“If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs
indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit: whether they do
(subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is no liability
under either state or federal law. . . . Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’
liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims
of tortious or criminal conduct?”).

FINAL_SCHORR

2013]

2/27/2014 6:30 PM

MALICIOUS CONTENT ON THE INTERNET

749

reads § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause.129
The second
interpretation is to read § 230(c)(1) as “foreclos[ing] any liability
that depends on deeming the ISP a ‘publisher’ . . . while
permitting the states to regulate ISPs in their capacity as
intermediaries.”130
In FTC v. Accusearch Inc.,131 the Tenth Circuit held that
encouraging illegal content undercuts immunity.132 In that case,
a website “solicited requests for confidential information,” in the
form of personal data “protected by law, paid researchers to find
it,” and disclosed the protected information to paying
customers.133 The website attempted to invoke the protections of
§ 230 because the researchers who provided the information were
third parties.134 This approach utilized the Zeran test as a basis
for its analysis, but added two additional prongs: (1) whether the
content was developed by the website; and (2) whether the
website was responsible for the content in question.135 The first
prong defines “develop” broadly, noting that “dictionary
definitions for develop correspondingly revolve around the act of
drawing something out, making it ‘visible,’ ‘active,’ or ‘usable.’ ”136
The second prong requires that “one must be more than a neutral
conduit for [the developed] content . . . . [A] service provider is
‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content only if it in
some way specifically encourages development of what is
offensive about the content.”137
These additional prongs
narrowed the scope of the analysis by requiring a more precise
analysis of the facts of the case than the original Zeran test.
Under the additional prongs, the court held that the website’s
actions were not “neutral” because “its actions were intended to

129

Id.
Id.
131
570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
132
Morley, supra note 124, at 15.
133
FTC, 570 F.3d at 1201.
134
Id. (“Accusearch attempts to portray itself as the provider of neutral tools,
stressing that it merely provided ‘a forum in which people advertise and request’
telephone records.”).
135
Id. at 1197–98 (“To begin with, we consider whether confidential telephone
records are ‘developed,’ within the meaning of the CDA, when, as here, they are sold
to the public over the Internet. . . . This conclusion, however, does not end the
inquiry. The question remains whether Accusearch was . . . responsible for the
development of the specific content that was the source of the alleged liability.”).
136
Id. at 1198.
137
Id. at 1199.
130
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generate” offensive content and therefore lacked immunity.138
Therefore, the website was responsible for the development of the
content in question and was not protected by § 230 immunity.139
III. CDA POLICY GOALS ARE NO LONGER SUPPORTED
The primary problem with judicial interpretation of CDA
§ 230 as it stands is that it fails to account for malicious content
that ISP operators like JuicyCampus actively solicit. The main
issue behind this analytical gap is that the courts fail to
incorporate an assessment of Congress’s policy objectives for
enacting § 230. This failure immunizes gossip websites despite
the fact that behavior employed by these websites undermines
the fundamental policy reasons for enacting the CDA. Actively
soliciting objectionable material strays from the two core goals of
the CDA § 230: (1) promoting the growth of the Internet as a
forum for free speech; and (2) encouraging website operators to
monitor their content without fear that such action would
implicate them as publishers and would therefore make them
liable for objectionable content provided by third parties under
state defamation laws.140 As a result, the current approaches to
interpreting § 230 all have shortcomings.
A.

The Failures of Zeran

Although the Zeran test adheres to the text of the CDA, it
fails to consider the corresponding policy reasons for the section’s
enactment. This is evident in the holding of the New York Court
of Appeals case, Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York,
Inc.141 In Shiamili, Real Estate operated a blog soliciting
imprudent comments about its business competitor, Shiamili.
Shiamili sued after one comment posted under a pseudonym was
upgraded to a stand-alone post, and more reckless and harmful
comments were posted to a forum established below the
upgraded post.142

138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1199, 1201.
See supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
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The Holding

In Shiamili, a split court adopted the Zeran line of
reasoning, “read[ing] section 230 as generally immunizing
Internet service providers from liability for third-party content
wherever such liability depends on characterizing the provider as
a ‘publisher or speaker’ of objectionable material.”143 The court
utilized the three prongs of the Zeran test. First, the court
determined that the blog operator was an ISP.144 Like the courts
before it, the court highlighted the difference between ISPs,
which are shielded by the CDA § 230 when “the content at issue
is provided by ‘another information content provider[,]’ ”145 and
information content providers, which are not issued immunity for
content they make available.146
Therefore, § 230 grants
immunity to ISPs from state law liability.147 Second, under the
Zeran line of cases, websites acting as publishers, by “deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content,” are
granted immunity as ISPs.148 Third, in this case the complaint
alleged that a third-party user was responsible for the
objectionable content, thereby failing to allege that Real Estate
was the content provider.149 This fact lead the court to “reject
Shiamili’s contention that defendants should be deemed content
providers because they created and ran a Web site which
implicitly encouraged users to post negative comments.”150
Furthermore, the court reasoned, “[e]ven assuming that
solicitation can constitute ‘development,’ this is plainly not a case
143
Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288–89, 952 N.E.2d
1011, 1017, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 (2011) (“Today, we follow what may fairly be called
the national consensus.”).
144
Id. at 290, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26 (“Shiamili does not
dispute that defendants, as alleged Web site operators, are providers of an
‘interactive computer service’ under section 230.”).
145
Id. at 289, 952 N.E.2d at 1017, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (quoting
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012)).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 286, 952 N.E.2d at 1015, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 23 (“A defendant is therefore
immune from state law liability if (1) it is a ‘provider or user of an interactive
computer service’; (2) the complaint seeks to hold the defendant liable as a ‘publisher
or speaker’; and (3) the action is based on ‘information provided by another
information content provider.’ ”).
148
Id. at 289, 952 N.E.2d at 1017, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (citations omitted).
149
Id. at 290, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
150
Id. at 290–91, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26 (“Creating an open
forum for third parties to post content—including negative commentary—is at the
core of what section 230 protects.”).
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where the Web site can be charged with soliciting the defamatory
content at issue.”151 Fourth, while Real Estate may have been a
content provider as to the heading, subheading, and illustration
accompanying the upgraded post, this content is not actionable
because the complaint does not allege its defamatory nature.152
2.

The Dissent

Chief Judge Lippman strongly dissented and illustrated the
failures of applying the Zeran test.153 The dissent refused to
accept that Real Estate’s activity was “benign.”154 The dissent
discussed the allegations of defendants’ “efforts to instigate
additional attacks against plaintiff’s character and business”155
and stated that “defendants’ attachment of this illustration, if
proven, should alone defeat their immunity under the CDA.”156
The dissent elaborated, discussing Congress’s intent to protect
ISPs from liability when they were making a good faith effort to
limit the “availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”157 If this was the
initial purpose of CDA § 230, the dissent argued, “an
interpretation that immunizes a business’s complicity in
defaming a direct competitor takes us so far afield from the
purpose of the CDA as to make it unrecognizable.”158
B.

Insufficient Minority Approaches

1.

The Seventh Circuit’s Approaches

The Seventh Circuit adopted two alternative readings of
§ 230, both of which are insufficient. The first is to read
§ 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause.159 This reading removes

151

Id. at 291, 952 N.E.2d at 1018, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
Id. at 292, 952 N.E.2d at 1019–20, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 27–28.
153
Id. at 293–94, 952 N.E.2d at 1020, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (Lippman, C.J.,
dissenting).
154
Id. at 294, 952 N.E.2d at 1020, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (“But, the allegations of
defendants’ actions here are not so benign.”).
155
Id. at 294, 952 N.E.2d at 1020–21, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28–29.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 295, 952 N.E.2d at 1021, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 29 (quoting
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012)).
158
Id. at 295, 952 N.E.2d at 1021–22, 929 N.Y.S. at 29–30.
159
See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
152
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immunity only if the website “created the objectionable
information.”160 Using creation as the determinative standard is
circular in nature. If the content was posted by a third party, the
website could argue that it must have been created by the third
party or it would have posted the content itself. Under this logic,
gossip websites and blogs would immunize themselves from
liability by simply stating that they could not have created the
content because it was created by the third-party poster.
The second alternative reading simply “forecloses any
liability that depends on deeming the ISP a ‘publisher[,]’ ”161
which removes any remedy for those bringing defamation
actions. The court itself stated that “defamation law would be a
good example of such” foreclosed liability.162 Therefore, this test
is far more restrictive to defamation victims than even the Zeran
test.
2.

The Flaws of the Tenth Circuit’s Approach

The Tenth Circuit’s test comes closest to being effective
because it considers the policy reasons for enacting § 230 by
examining the neutrality or activeness of the website. The
court’s broad definition of “develop” implies that activities like
solicitation would rise to the level of development.163 However,
the test does not look at the nature of the website—other than
distinguishing between an ISP and ICP. Without taking this
issue into account, the test fails to differentiate between websites
that are intended to perform a community service and not merely
defame, from those websites that are intended to spread
malicious content.164 If a court does not consider the nature of
the website, the broad definition of develop would encompass
websites that solicit non-harmful content with the intent to
perform a constructive service to the community. Therefore,
these constructive websites would not be immunized even though
their immunization would uphold congressional intent.165

160
161
162
163
164
165

Id.
Id.
Id.
See FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
See infra Part IV.A.
See supra Part II.B.
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IV. CONSTRUCTING A NARROWER TEST
It is evident that a new test is necessary to determine the
scope of immunity under § 230 to better promote the
congressional intent behind the statute. The rise of actively
unfriendly websites has contorted the Zeran analysis, providing
immunity to those whom Congress never contemplated would be
implicated by § 230. Instead of self-policing, some websites
solicit content that is in many cases defamatory per se, hiding
behind § 230’s shield of immunity and proclaiming freedom of
speech. While § 230 certainly purported to promote freedom of
speech, its ultimate goal was to protect those who were utilizing
freedom of speech on the Internet in a responsible and civil way,
those who would provide a medium for widespread exchange of
valuable information in an immediate way—a responsible and
legal Internet.
This Note proposes modifying the Zeran test by adding three
additional prongs to determine whether a website should receive
§ 230 immunity. As it stands, the Zeran line requires the court
to begin with three questions: (1) is the defendant an ISP; (2) was
the defendant acting as a publisher; and (3) was the content
provided by a third party?166 After engaging in this analysis the
court should contemplate three additional questions, all of which
would need to be satisfied in order to remove immunity. First,
the court should determine whether the primary purpose of the
website is constructive. Second, the court should determine
whether the ISP was active or passive in receiving and
dispersing third-party content. Factors that the court should
consider include—but are not limited to—the following: whether
the website solicits content; whether the website enhances the
content in a significant way; and whether the website indicates
its support of the third party. Third, the court should determine
whether the content at issue is objectionable on its face. Factors
that the court should consider include whether the particular
content is defamatory per se under state law and whether the
merits of the content at issue outweigh the alleged injury. This
Note does not suggest that the court stifle communication by
holding it to be defamatory. Rather, it argues that the immunity
of the CDA be lifted in the appropriate circumstances so that a

166

See supra Part II.D.1.
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determination may be made in the appropriate forum as to
whether the subject of the offending post has in fact been
defamed.
A.

Primary Purpose Test

The first additional prong recognizes that some websites
solicit comments that are recklessly harmful but do so while
contributing to social utility. This test requires the court to
determine whether the social utility of the website is greater
than the harm inflicted by the content the website broadcasts.
Websites that have greater social utility are constructive because
they provide a service to the public. This prong distinguishes
websites like Yelp.com (“Yelp”) and Angieslist.com (“Angie’s
List”), websites that solicit reviews of businesses from customers
to inform the public, from those whose sole purpose is to display
defamatory content.167 Yelp’s purpose is to “help people find
great local businesses like dentists, hair stylists[,] and
mechanics.”168 Moreover, Yelp’s general guidelines discourage
users from posting inappropriate content and private
information, something that gossip websites do not.169 Angie’s
List takes greater measures than Yelp to ensure that content is
of a certain caliber. Angie’s List requires users to join and does
not allow anonymous reviews.170 Gossip sites and the blog in
question in Shiamili.171 do not contribute social utility. Instead,
their primary purpose is to broadcast defamatory content on the
Internet. Under this prong, websites distinguished as having a
primary purpose that provides social utility would maintain
immunity while those websites that do not perform a public
service would have to satisfy the other two prongs of the analysis
to maintain immunity. Essentially, this prong would act as a
safety mechanism for websites that have both a social purpose
and may potentially run into trouble with defamatory comments.

167

See, e.g., Write a Review, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/writeareview (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014); Frequently Asked Questions, ANGIE’S LIST,
http://angieslist.com/faq.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
168
About Us, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/about (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
169
See Content Guidelines, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/guidelines (last visited
Jan. 18, 2014).
170
How It Works, ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/howitworks.aspx (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014).
171
See supra Part I.
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Active v. Passive Solicitation

The second additional prong recognizes that ISPs are not
always innocent bystanders to third-party content and when they
are not, they should not be rewarded as such. The majority test
assumes that message boards and open forums allowing third
parties to comment unsupervised are all alike in their
neutrality.172 In the current Internet age, this is not the case.
Based on the discussion of gossip websites and Shiamili above,173
it is clear that soliciting harmful content should implicate ISPs
as “responsible” for the objectionable content and not protect
them as mere neutral service providers.
If a website actively solicits harmful content, § 230 immunity
will not apply. A website actively solicits content when it seeks
out posts and comments of a certain kind. Solicitation by nature
indicates a potential responsibility for the content. Simply
defined, to solicit means to request. In determining whether the
website solicited the content, a court should consider the two
different types of solicitation: neutral and intentional. Neutral
solicitation can be illustrated by the following example: A
website like the The New York Times posts news articles with
space beneath for comments on the article.174 By posting the
article, the website functions as an ICP. By providing a forum
for comments, the website functions as an ISP. In this example,
the nature of solicitation is neutral because the website merely
seeks a response to the content of an article regardless of what it
is. The website is neutral to what the third parties post in
response. Intentional solicitation, on the other hand, is the
behavior that websites like JuicyCampus engage in. In the case
of the gossip websites mentioned above and the blog in Shiamili,
the specific kind of information sought out is malicious and
inflammatory.
When websites engage in intentional solicitation, they are
undermining one of the two reasons for enacting § 230:
encouraging self-policing. In fact, providing immunity to those
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See supra Part II.D.1.
See supra Part I.
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See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Pennsylvania Judge Puts Voter ID Law on Hold for
Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/us/
pennsylvania-judge-delays-implementation-of-voter-id-law.html; see also Terms of
Service, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/rights/terms/terms-ofservice.html (last updated Jan. 9, 2014).
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who solicit salacious content does the exact opposite. The current
policy suggests that there is no difference between those who
make a good faith effort to self-police, thereby working to
maintain a high quality standard as to the information they
disperse, and those who refuse to remove objectionable content
because they like stirring up controversy. As a result, the
Internet has become a safe-harbor for those who wish to promote
content that would be unacceptable if broadcast through a
different medium. At this point in time, unlike when § 230 was
enacted, the Internet is an expansive and thriving network.175
Therefore, it is more important to reestablish the policy
encouraging self-policing and to establish a policy discouraging
development of malicious websites.
The proposed prong will both reinforce the policy of
encouraging self-policing176 and will discourage websites that
exist only to inflame and create controversy from developing.
Removing ISPs’ unconditional immunity will encourage website
operators to think twice about what content they choose to
permit on their website. The safeguard for those who cannot
remove all objectionable third-party content would still be an
easily satisfied test, provided the ISPs did not intentionally
solicit malicious or recklessly harmful material.
This key
distinction benefits society by protecting the integrity of school
campuses, minimizing small town rumor mills, and diminishing
the availability of forums to interfere with business competitors’
livelihoods. Moreover, if an ISP falls within the safeguard, the
website may be given a chance to cure without being subject to
harsh liability.
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, this test would
be a proactive step in the fight against cyberbullying. By
removing ISP immunity on websites that solicit salacious
comments from anonymous users, websites will be less inclined
to provide anonymous forums with purely malicious content.
Potential liability would urge ISPs to take greater care regarding
the content they choose to promote and request from their users.
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See generally Berners-Lee, supra note 84.
While this test would encourage self-policing, it does not necessarily impose a
mandatory duty to monitor and cure. That discussion is outside the scope of this
Note.
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Objectionable Content

The third proposed prong requires courts to evaluate what
type of material should be protected. This analytical step
recognizes that there are different levels of objectionable content,
and providers of the more malicious content should not benefit
from the protections afforded by § 230. This prong mimics the
primary purpose prong of the test, applying the same social
utility standard to individual content. When a statement’s only
value is to publicly embarrass or inflict pain, the victim should
have a form of recourse regardless of the medium employed to
disperse the statement. If, on the other hand, the statement
contains information that provides a benefit to the public in some
way, the website should maintain its immunity.
Unlike the federal statute, state laws impute liability for
content that the common law found the most unseemly.177 When
such content is at issue, states classify it as defamatory per se.178
In the event that particular libel or slander is defamatory per se,
the defendant is unfailingly liable.179
It is unconvincing to argue that federal law should prevail
over state law for objectionable content because the Internet is so
expansive and crosses state lines. As it stands, the federal law
immunizes Internet providers in any state, whereas their print
counterparts would be held liable under state law. When
defamatory content is presented in another medium, state
defamation law would apply in order to determine liability.
Innocent victims of defamatory content posted on the Internet
deserve the same relief that they would have received had the
same content been presented through a medium other than the
Internet. Much of the content on JuicyCampus, for example, was
defamatory per se, and actionable if false.180 Users made
statements about the sexual conduct of their peers and
allegations that their peers carry sexually transmitted
infections.181 Under most state laws, there is no question that
publicly and falsely stating that a female is promiscuous would
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See supra Part II.A.
See id.
179
See id.
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See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
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Jenna Wortham, JuicyCampus, Collegiate Tabloid, Goes Offline, N.Y. TIMES
BITS (Feb. 5, 2009, 4:47 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/juicycampuscollegiate-tabloid-goes-offline/.
178

FINAL_SCHORR

2013]

2/27/2014 6:30 PM

MALICIOUS CONTENT ON THE INTERNET

759

result in liability regardless of whether that statement was
printed in a newspaper or announced over the radio.182 But the
fact that the statement was posted on the Internet, where the
website only provided a forum for “juicy” posts, activated § 230
immunity.
Because the federal law does prevail, however, it is
important to consider the type of content we, as a society, want to
protect and encourage. The Internet makes it easy for people
with access to express themselves. If we provide immunity to
those who encourage third parties to express themselves while
inflicting legal injury upon others, injuries that would have a
remedy in any other situation, it will be impossible to protect the
typical citizen’s privacy and reputation.
As young adults are constantly reminded, anything posted to
the Internet leaves a digital footprint. When employers are
vetting their candidates, the first place they look is the Internet.
The implications of protecting content that harms the victim in
both the present and future are enormous. Courts should,
therefore, be required to balance the merits of the content
against the potential damage it could cause.
If the first proposed prong is satisfied because certain
content was actively solicited, and if that same content would be
protected in another medium, § 230 immunity should not apply.
Content that the common law has recognized as defamatory per
se is equally as injurious on the Internet as it is in print.
Comments that are considered defamatory per se under state law
are those that society discourages because their contents are
particularly injurious.183 Changing the medium through which
someone’s reputation is attacked does not negate the impact of
the words. In fact, the Internet allows for those same words to be
spread to more people at a faster rate. Because the Internet can
be accessed by anyone from almost anywhere, defamatory
content spreads much more easily and increases the potential
that an individual’s reputation will be harmed.

182
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See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 4.
See id.
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D. Test Case
For all the reasons expressed in Chief Judge Lippman’s
dissent,184 the outcome of Shiamili under the Zeran test was
unsatisfactory. However, if the court had applied the minority
circuit tests, the result still would have fallen victim to Chief
Judge Lippman’s criticisms. Under the Seventh Circuit’s first
approach of reading § 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause, Real
Estate would only be immune “if it created the objectionable
information.”185 However, because the content was posted by a
third party, Real Estate would claim that it could not have
created the content because the third party who posted it created
it.186 Under the second approach the Seventh Circuit articulates,
because this is an action for defamation, a cause of action that
depends on treating the blog operator as a “publisher,” the blog’s
liability as an ISP would be foreclosed.187 Although the Tenth
Circuit’s approach would yield a satisfactory result in this case,
websites like Yelp and Angie’s List would be open to liability,
despite the intent of CDA § 230 to immunize those types of
beneficial websites.
If the New York State Court of Appeals had added these
three additional prongs to its analysis, the result of Shiamili
could have been considerably different. The Court determined
that Real Estate was an ISP, that Real Estate was acting as a
publisher, and that the information was provided by a third
party, thereby implicating § 230 immunity. When the three
proposed prongs are applied, however, Real Estate might not be
provided immunity because it would lack a primary purpose
other than to instigate injurious dialogue, be both an active and
soliciting website, and the nature of the content would be, on its
face, defamatory.188
Under the first prong, because the blog itself served no
purpose other than to broadcast negative information about
Shiamili’s personal life, Real Estate would be subject to
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See supra Part III.A.2.
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
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See supra Part III.B.1.
187
Id.
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If only a few of the comments resulted in defamatory content, and the
primary purpose was to actually solicit real estate listings, the primary purpose test
would not be satisfied, and therefore, the defendants would be afforded § 230
immunity.
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evaluation under the other two prongs. Had Real Estate been
trying to provide useful information to consumers instead of
encouraging attacks against Shiamili with no social utility, the
analysis would end here and immunity would be activated. This
is where the Tenth Circuit’s approach would fail because in the
event that Real Estate was providing a beneficial service through
this blog, it would not be protected by § 230.
Second, Real Estate satisfies the proposed second prong as
an active website.
Real Estate upgraded the defamatory
comment by “Ardor Real Estate Sucks” to a standalone post and
added an illustration, headline, and a fresh forum for comments.
By upgrading the initial comment to a standalone post, Real
Estate indicated that this type of content is supported by its
website. While the content of that comment is covered by § 230,
immunity does not apply to the comments that resulted because
Real Estate flagrantly supported the initial comment’s
assertions. Broadcasting its support for the post by “Ardor Real
Estate Sucks” informed the blog’s readers that this is the kind of
content the website supports. Conveying its support and then
adding the open—and once again, anonymous—comment forum
below the post indicates that Real Estate was asking its users to
respond to the hateful comment it supported, and any reasonable
user would understand that the website was seeking more
injurious content about Shiamili.
Even if the court decided that the acts of upgrading and
establishing a new forum are insufficient to establish solicitation,
the website operator blatantly encouraged third parties to
continue posting hateful comments about Shiamili by responding
to a new comment on the thread. One particularly malicious
comment concluded, “call me a Liar and I’ll come back here and
get REALLY specific.”189 Real Estate’s website operator replied
to that comment with the sole word “liar” under a pseudonym.190
This action alone suffices as active solicitation.
Such
encouragement was the equivalent of asking the poster to add
more specific harmful information about Shiamili.
Third, the content generated on the new forum falls within
the bounds of defamation per se, and therefore the content at
issue is objectionable on its face.
Alleging that Shiamili
189

Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 285, 952 N.E.2d
1011, 1014, 929 N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (2011).
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“mistreated his employees, could not retain real estate agents,
[and] failed to pay office bills”191 falls directly within defamation
per se under the category of imputing misconduct in an
Because the content is
individual’s profession or office.192
defamatory per se, under New York law, Real Estate would be
liable for defamation. Under this new test, immunity would not
apply because Real Estate actively solicited defamatory content,
and the content is objectionable on its face because it is
defamatory per se.
CONCLUSION
This Note sought to demonstrate that the scope of § 230
should be narrowed to better promote the policies underlying its
enactment. While this Note appreciates the merits of granting
immunity to passive ISPs, defamation victims deserve a means of
recourse regardless of whether the statements at issue are
printed in a newspaper, broadcast over the radio, or published for
the world to see on an active, soliciting Internet website.
Accordingly, this Note has identified the wide array of problems
with granting active ISPs immunity for third-party content and
proposed a test that will narrow the scope of § 230 where ISPs
lack social utility and actively solicit content that is objectionable
on its face, thereby establishing a system for victims of Internetbased defamation to obtain justice.

191
Id. at 293, 952 N.E.2d at 1020, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 28 (Lippman, C.J.,
dissenting).
192
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 202 (2012) (“[C]ommunication is
defamatory per se if it imputes misconduct in a person’s trade, profession, office, or
occupation.”).

